This paper demonstrates health insurers' incentives to design benefits that differentially appeal to profitable enrollees and deter unprofitable enrollees in Medicare Part D. A system of diagnosis-specific payments was meant to neutralize insurer benefit design incentives by paying insurers more for the sick than for the healthy. These diagnosis-specific payments were held steady even as treatment costs for diagnoses rose or fell with the entry of new drugs or the onset of generic competition. As a result, some diagnoses were clearly profitable for insurers, while others were clearly unprofitable. I show that Part D insurers covered drugs that treat the profitable at higher rates and lower copayments than drugs that treat the unprofitable.
1 Introduction many drugs for that diagnosis and setting low copayments for them. In Section 2, I explain these aspects of Medicare Part D in more detail. This paper continues a prior theoretical literature demonstrating insurers' benefit design incentives when insurers cannot discriminate among applicants but know what services attract profitable and unprofitable enrollees. Prior models focus on a "managed care" setting where insurers control utilization through administrative rationing rather than through coverage and copay. Consequently, insurers do not use copays to directly attract and deter beneficiaries, but rather set administrative hurdles that induce lower levels of utilization and deter enrollment (Frank, Glazer, and McGuire, 2000) . This paper also furthers a recent literature on diagnosis-specific payment systems in Medicare. Brown, Duggan, Kuziemko, and Woolston (2011) demonstrate that insurers in a Medicare program similar to Part D (Medicare Advantage) differentially enrolled individuals who cost less than their diagnosis-specific payment and successfully deterred the enrollment of unprofitable individuals. I review these two strands of literature in Section 3.
I then develop a model of insurer's choice of copay and coverage when diagnosis-specific payments diverge from average treatment costs. Beneficiaries choose enrollment and drug quantities on the basis of copay, and insurers set profit-maximizing copays taking diagnosis-specific payments into account. An insurer's decision to cover a given drug is modeled as an entry decision: an insurer who covers a drug has entered the market for enrollees who value that drug. Insurers receive an exogenous diagnosis-specific payment that is unrelated to treatment costs. The model predicts that more insurers will cover drugs that treat profitable diagnoses and will choose low copays for them; drugs that treat unprofitable diagnoses are covered at low rates and high copays. Details of the model are provided in Section 4.
An empirical strategy to test the relationship between benefit design and Part D's diagnosis-specific payments is described in Section 5. I first compare diagnosis-specific payments in the payment system with actual diagnosis-specific treatment costs in the prescription drug claims of a large sample of Part D enrollees.
Diagnoses with high payments relative to treatment costs are defined as profitable, while diagnoses with low payments relative to treatment costs are unprofitable. The empirical analogue of my theoretical model is that coverage and copay for a given drug should depend on the profitability of the diagnosis the drug treats. However, my measure of profitability is endogenous because unobserved drug quality affects both my profitability measure and my benefit design outcomes. I instrument for profitability with exogenous "technological change", meaning the exposure of each diagnosis to new molecules and new generics entering upon patent expiries. Due to the weakness of new molecules and new generics as instruments, I also develop a "Hausman" instrument that, by excluding a given drug from the profitability calculation, removes the unobserved drug quality that is the primary pathway for endogeneity.
Implementing the empirical strategy (Section 6) shows that the payment system failed to neutralize insurer benefit design incentives. Instead, consistent with the theory, insurers set more favorable benefits for drugs that treat profitable diagnoses compared to drugs that treat unprofitable diagnoses. I first establish that diagnosis-specific payments diverged from actual treatment costs, such that many diagnoses were clearly profitable or unprofitable. Applying my technological change instrument in a first stage regression, I find that each new molecule entering after payment system calibration lowers profitability by about $35; each new generic raises profitability by $25.
Finally, I show Part D insurers cover drugs that treat the profitable at higher rates and lower copays than drugs that treat the unprofitable. The results are broadly similar across three models: directly measuring profitability, instrumenting for it with technological change, and applying the Hausman instrument. If a given diagnosis-specific payment had been set higher by $10, rates of coverage for drugs for that diagnosis would have been very slightly higher, and copayments would have been more than $7 less. If diagnosisspecific payments had been set equal to average treatment costs, enrollees with unprofitable diagnoses under the original system would have paid less in copays while enrollees with profitable diagnoses would have paid more; the size of the transfer is at least $1.5 billion, or 9% of total enrollee expenditures. Finally, my results suggest an improvement in Part D regulation that would reduce the effect of payment system inaccuracies on benefit design by recognizing that the diagnosis-specific payment system will have diagnosis-specific effects on incentives.
Payment systems like the one used in Part D are integral to recent public health insurance expansions such as the Affordable Care Act exchanges. This paper raises questions about the ability of diagnosis-specific payments to neutralize insurer benefit design incentives. In particular, the government generally announces such payment systems before the market begins, and leaves them in place for several years. When changes in medical technology, such as new drug entry or the onset of generic competition, cause treatment costs and payment levels to diverge, insurer benefit design incentives will persist.
How Part D Works
In this section, I explain why there are strong benefit design incentives in Medicare Part D and why it is possible to detect them. I first review evidence suggesting that Medicare beneficiaries have private information on drug needs. Because of this private information, beneficiaries' enrollment decisions respond to the coverage and copays insurers set for specific drugs. While program rules constrain their actions, insurers can use coverage and copay to attract the profitable and deter the unprofitable. Finally, I describe the Part D payment system, which pays insurers a set amount, calibrated on inappropriate data, for each of a beneficiary's diagnoses. I consider each aspect of Part D in turn.
Beneficiaries Respond to Benefit Design
Beneficiaries appear to have private information on both their level of drug utilization and the exact drugs they will purchase. The presence of beneficiary private information can be inferred from three types of evidence. Firstly, there was no private market prior to Part D's implementation in 2006. Secondly, those who benefit most from Part D were most likely to enroll. Finally, direct evidence on drug utilization shows that both total spending and exact drug purchases are highly correlated across years.
Part D was created because the private market did not provide a product that protected seniors and the disabled from the risk of high prescription drug expenses. When the Medicare program began offering universal coverage to the elderly in 1965, prescription drugs were excluded from the benefit. Beginning (Levy and Weir, 2009) . Economic research on drug utilization among the elderly suggests that the threat of adverse selection inhibited the development of a fully private market (Pauly and Zeng, 2004; Goldman, Joyce, Karaca-Mandic, and Sood, 2006; Cline and Mott, 2003) .
Most beneficiaries without alternative insurance chose to enroll in Part D, but those who did not appear to be positively selected. Because of significant government funding -Medicare pays 75% of total Part D costs -and means-tested out-of-pocket payments, enrollment was optimal for most market participants (Heiss, McFadden, and Winter, 2010; Heiss, Winter, and McFadden, 2009 ). In 2008, about half of Medicare's 44 million beneficiaries were in the market for Part D (i.e., no retiree benefit or Medicare Advantage), and of those about 80% were enrolled (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2008) . Enrollment in 2006 was higher among those with high drug utilization prior to Part D (Yin et al., 2008; Pizer, Frakt, and Feldman, 2008; Levy and Weir, 2009 ). Surveys of those who chose to remain uninsured find that the uninsured fall into two groups (Neuman et al., 2007; Heiss, McFadden, and Winter, 2006) . The first group are chronically ill, low-income, and often cognitively impaired. Many of these individuals can enroll in Part D at zero premium, and may have done so as awareness and outreach improved (Ketcham, Lucarelli, Miravete, and Roebuck (2012) show the enrollment decisions of Part D enrollees improved rapidly after 2006, especially for the very old and cognitively impaired). The second group, however, are relatively healthy beneficiaries: almost a quarter of eligible beneficiaries with no chronic conditions chose not to enroll in Part D when it first became available.
Direct evidence shows that among Medicare beneficiaries, prescription drug utilization in one year is a very good predictor of prescription drug utilization in the next year. Most prescription drug spending in the Medicare population is associated with chronic diseases, with nearly half the total on diabetes, cholesterol, or cardiovascular drugs alone (Soni, 2008) . Hsu et al. (2009) estimated the Spearman's correlation between decile of total drug spending in consecutive years to be 0.83. Finally, within the setting of Part D, Heiss, Leive, McFadden, and Winter (2012) show that individuals choosing a plan based purely on current year prescriptions choose the ex-post optimal plan more often than any of a number of rational expectations models they test, a result that follows from a high degree of persistence of exact drug purchases.
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Taken together, this evidence suggests that beneficiaries know what drugs they need and can choose an insurance plan based on the coverage and copay of drugs they expect to take. Copays paid by enrollees vary over the course of the year as their spending levels hit certain thresholds. In this paper, I focus on copays in the "initial coverage zone", where insurers have the largest latitude in copay setting. The initial coverage zone starts after a deductible ($295 in 2009) and continues until total drug expenditure is $2,700, when a "coverage gap", a.k.a. "doughnut hole", begins. Beneficiaries then pay all costs until their yearto-date copays total $4,350, when a "catastrophic zone" of coverage begins. In 2009, nearly two-thirds of beneficiaries only purchased drugs in the initial coverage zone and copays for purchases in the initial coverage zone represented 54% of total copays.
Insurers Control Benefit Design
Insurers seek to design a benefit that is profitable when marketed to the beneficiaries described above.
Two decisions characterize an insurer's benefit design. Firstly, the insurer chooses, within program rules, what drugs to cover. Beneficiaries pay the full amount for drugs that are not "covered", while insurers pay all but the copay for drugs that are. Because coverage is an obvious way for an insurer to deter sick beneficiaries, Part D insurers have to comply with certain regulations. Firstly, insurers had to cover all the drugs in six "protected" therapeutic classes: antiretrovirals, antineoplastics (anti-cancer drugs), antidepressants, antipsychotics, anticonvulsants, and immune suppressants. In addition, plans were required to cover two drugs in each United States Pharmacoepia "therapeutic class". However, plans still vary considerably in their rates of coverage, as documented by Goldman, Joyce, and Vogt (2011) . Using a sample of 152 commonly-prescribed drugs (both brands and generics), Hoadley, Hargrave, Cubanski, and Neuman (2006) shows that some plans cover fewer than two-thirds, while others cover nearly all. Hoadley also documents that drugs in different therapeutic classes are covered at very different rates; such a finding is consistent with the relationship between drug coverage and diagnosis-specific profitability I document in this paper.
In addition to choosing drug coverage, the insurer sets drug copays, again constrained by program rules.
The Part D legislation defined a "basic benefit": plans pay 75% of drug costs in the initial coverage, 0% in the coverage gap, and 15% in the catastrophic zone. Plans could choose to deviate from the 25% copays in the initial coverage zone prescribed by the basic benefit, although they had to show that, for the type of Medicare beneficiaries they expect to attract, total copays equaled 25% of total drug costs.
2 In practice, this constraint means that plans can raise copays for certain drugs as long as they lower them for others.
Coverage and copays in the initial coverage zone are insurers' major strategic variables. Firstly, purchases in the initial coverage zone account for over two-thirds of total insurer liability. Secondly, while insurers can choose to lower copays in the coverage gap or throughout the benefit, they must finance the lower copays fully through higher premiums. In practice, copays outside the initial coverage zone are close to the levels prescribed by the basic benefit, while as we will see in Table 2 , copays in the initial coverage zone show substantial variation across drugs.
Drug coverage and copays determine premium, which is not a strategic variable in Part D. Instead, each plan submits its benefit design to a Medicare-designed application that finds the cost of providing the basic benefit to a "typical" beneficiary (not the beneficiary the plan expects to attract). The cost of providing the basic benefit to a typical beneficiary in insurance plan i is the plan's bid. Then the premium for insurer i is set to
where bid is the national average bid (weighted by prior-year enrollment), and γ is a fixed percentage (36% in 2009). Then plans with overall generous benefit designs (many covered drugs, low copays) collect dollarfor-dollar higher premiums, while those with low costs can charge low premiums (subject to a zero lower bound).
Diagnoses Correspond to Profitability Due to Diagnosis-Specific Payments
Recall that Medicare pays insurers approximately 75% of total Part D costs. These payments differ based on enrollee diagnoses. Diagnosis-specific payments can, in theory, offset insurers' incentives to distort benefits.
Larger payments for unprofitable types can equalize profitability across all beneficiaries, so that insurers are indifferent among applicants. The practice of conditioning payments to insurers on type is known as risk adjustment. Medicare created a system of diagnosis-and demographic-specific payments for Part D that, in theory, compensated insurers for the expected cost of enrolling a given beneficiary. In this section, I describe those diagnosis-specific payments and what makes them inaccurate.
Medicare had to calibrate the payment system before Part D began and therefore before the appropriate data was available. The payment system designers, Robst, Levy, and Ingber (2007) 
D jx and D jg are dummies for the 86 diagnoses (indexed by x) and the demographic categories (indexed by g). W x and W g represent the treatment costs associated with each diagnosis or demographic category for this population. In addition, the payment system includes multiplicative factors (separate for the aged and disabled subpopulation) that express the degree to which spending is higher for low-income individuals and those who are long-term institutionalized. The coefficient for each diagnosis is expressed as a weight with lower copays such that its bid was $1500, that plan would receive $642.00.
New molecules and new generics entering upon patent expiry can dramatically change the cost of treating a given diagnosis, but the payment system makes no provision for such changes. The calibration data for the payment system was from 2000 and 2002, but the levels in the payment system were held steady until 2011, when the payment system was updated (Kautter, Ingber, Pope, and Freeman, 2012 Robst, Levy, and Ingber (2007) . Inasmuch as generic simvastatin costs less than brand name Zocor, this patent expiration lowered the average treatment costs of High Cholesterol. The payment for High Cholesterol, however, was held steady. At the other end of the spectrum, the treatment of multiple sclerosis (as opposed to simply symptom management) became widespread in in the first decade of the new millenium due to the introduction and expansion of several expensive immunological drugs (Miller, 2011; Cohen, 2009 ).
As we will see in Section 6.2, treatment costs for Multiple Sclerosis greatly exceed its payment.
This payment system was in effect for the first five program years (2006 to 2010, inclusive) . In the year studied in this paper, 2010, at least eight years had passed since the expenditures used to calibrate the diagnosis-specific weights were incurred. In addition, insurers were encountering this system for the fifth year, allowing plenty of time for insurers' internal analysis to detect the difference between diagnosis-specific payments and average treatment costs.
We have seen that in Part D benefit design incentives are strong due to beneficiary private information, that insurers have control over benefit design, and that the Part D payment system could fail to neutralize insurer benefit design incentives. In the next section, I review two related literatures: theoretical models of similar settings that predict how insurers might react and empirical evaluations of Medicare's payment systems.
Related Literature: Insurer Incentives and Medicare Payments
A relatively robust theoretical literature analyzes insurer incentives in a setting similar to Part D. These models, reviewed in Ellis (2008) , assume that (1) individuals have private information on their profitability, (2) insurers cannot deny enrollment or charge premiums based on profitability, and (3) beneficiaries of different types vary (in a known way) in their preference for different medical services. These theoretical models date from the "managed care" era in health insurance; approximating the managed care environment, insurers control the quantity of medical services administratively rather than through copayments and coverage.
Insurers set a "shadow price" for each service that beneficiaries pay in time and hassle, but coverage and copays are not set directly. In the first model of "shadow price", Frank, Glazer, and McGuire (2000) define it as "a device to capture the myriad of strategies a plan uses to ration care, other than by demand-side cost sharing (literal prices)." The authors show that the shadow price should be inversely proportional to expected profit from an individual: if the plan expects positive profits from a given type, the shadow price for services demanded by that type should be lowered. Jack (2006) places the model in a traditional Rothschild-Stiglitz framework, but the basic conclusions do not change. Insurers' benefit design incentives can be neutralized in these models if an omniscient social planner pays each insurer the expected cost of each individual McGuire, 2002, 2000) .
A later iteration of this model demonstrates that a medical service's predictability and predictiveness both increase insurers' incentives to distort benefit design (Ellis and McGuire, 2007) . A service's predictability is the degree to which individuals can anticipate needing it. As discussed in the previous section, Part D is a particularly good setting for empirically assessing benefit design incentives since the high autocorrelation of drug spending makes it predictable to the individual. A service's predictiveness is the degree to which it predicts overall medical spending. In the Part D setting, a diagnosis with a payment equal to its treatment costs that tends to co-occur with an unprofitable diagnosis will be predictive of overall unprofitability. In Section 6.5, I interpret my results in light of diagnoses' predictiveness.
The literature on benefit design incentives is not accompanied by empirical evidence, presumably because in the absence of something akin to the Part D payment system it is difficult to identify individuals' profitability as well as the services that attract and deter them. However, a small literature assesses the impact of Medicare's diagnosis-and demographic-specific payment system. Brown, Duggan, Kuziemko, and . This paper begins from the same premise -that inaccuracies in the payment system affect insurer behavior. In their case, the payment system is inaccurate because multiple "types" (i.e., mild and severe forms of a diagnosis) are associated with a single payment.
In my case, it is inaccurate due to the lack of appropriate data prior to Part D and the speed of industrial change in the drug industry. Brown et al. demonstrate that insurers differentially select for those who are inexpensive relative to their associated payment. I demonstrate how insurers accomplish this selection: by covering at low copays the drugs taken by those with high relative diagnosis-specific payments.
In the next section, I develop a model of copay and coverage in the setting like Medicare Part D where payments are unrelated to actual treatment costs.
A Model of Insurer Benefit Design
In this section, I develop a simple model of insurer incentives in a setting like Part D, starting from a version of Frank, Glazer, and McGuire's (2000) model of benefit design incentives (hereafter FGM00). In the model, beneficiaries are characterized by types that determine their valuation of different drugs. Beneficiaries evaluate insurance plans on the basis of copays and enroll in the plan that allows them highest utility. There are two stages of insurer decision-making. Firstly, each insurer decides whether to enter the market for a given drug by covering it, which involves a constant fixed cost of entry. Secondly, each entering insurer sets copays to maximize profits given drug prices, type-specific payments, and other insurers' copays. Type-specific payments are unrelated to actual treatment costs.
The analysis begins at the second step: the insurers who entered the market set profit-maximizing copays.
I examine the copays within a symmetric equilibrium. Then, a zero-profit condition determines the number of entrants. The objects of interest are the reaction of copays and the number of entrants to type-specific payments. As long as parameter values are such that an exogenously higher number of entrants induces lower copays, then the copays fall in type-specific payments and the number of entrants rises. An example using logit demand for plans and log utility for drugs leads to the same conclusions.
The model differs from FGM00 in two ways. The major addition is that the model incorporates an entry decision that represents insurers' choice of what services to cover. In addition, as in Part D insurers set an explicit copay for services instead of a "shadow price".
Preliminaries: Beneficiary Demand
Beneficiaries are characterized by types denoted by x. Different types of beneficiaries have different preferences for drugs. For simplicity, suppose each type corresponds to exactly one medical service, e.g., a drug.
Then a beneficiary of type x values a quantity q of drug x according to V x (q x ). The same beneficiary's valuation of any other drug is zero: V x (q −x ) = 0. Beneficiaries know their type and both beneficiaries and insurers know what service treats each type. Marginal utility is positive, declining, and convex (V x > 0,
Beneficiaries choose among insurance plans based on copays. Suppose a plan i sets copays c i = {c i1 , c i2 , ...c iX }.
A utility-maximizing beneficiary of type x enrolled in insurance plan i will choose q ix determined by
This equation implies a demand function q ix = q x (c ix ). The shape of utility V x implies that demand is decreasing and convex in copays. The shape of demand may vary across types x but for each type depends only on a plan's copays c ix and not the plan itself. Indirect utility for an individual of type x facing copays c ix is the utility of the drugs purchased at copay c ix less the individual's cost for them:
A beneficiary's valuation of an insurance plan is based on its copays and an idiosyncratic plan-specific preference taken from a known distribution.
The beneficiary enrolls in the plan with highest utility; all beneficiaries enroll in insurance. Let u x represent the utility of the beneficiary's most-preferred plan when insurance plan i is excluded from the choice set.
Following FGM00, insurer i takes other insurers' behavior as given, meaning that u x is fixed.
The beneficiary enrolls in i if its utility exceeds u x : v x (c ix ) + µ ix > u x . The probability that type x enrolls in insurance plan i with copay c ix for drug x is expressed by n x .
Example. Suppose V x (q x ) = ln q x and φ x (µ ix ) is the Type I Extreme Value distribution. Then q x (c ix ) = 1/c ix , and v x (c ix ) = − ln c ix − 1. The probability that an individual of type x enrolls in insurer i becomes
Step 2: Insurer Copay Decision
Suppose that in the Step 1 entry decision described below N x insurers chose to enter the market for type
x. In Step 2, each insurer chooses profit-maximizing copays, taking other insurers' behavior as given. The insurer's profit on an enrollee of type x depends on two exogenous inputs: drug price p x and a type-specific per-enrollee payment to the insurer r x > 0. Each insurer must purchase drugs for its enrollees from a drug firm at price p x . 4 Following FGM00, the type-specific per-enrollee payment r x does not affect a beneficiary's enrollment decision, either because it is paid by a third party (i.e., the government) or because it is paid by the beneficiary but does not vary across plans. In addition, the type-specific payment is unrelated to actual treatment costs.
When an insurer i setting copay of c ix enrolls an individual of type x, the insurer receives r x and then buys q x (c ix ) of drug x at price p x , partially offset by copay c ix . Let π x (c ix ) represent insurer i's profit on an individual of type x.
At copay c ix , the insurer's market share is the expected value of the enrollment probability for type x.
Market share depends on other insurers' copays through u x .
where κ, discussed in more detail below, is a fixed cost of entry to the market for drug x. Profit maximization with respect to copay c ix requires the following first-and second-order conditions:
where n ix ,n ix , q ix , and q ix represent the first and second derivatives with respect to copay c ix .
In the second-order condition, the second two terms are negative but the first term has the sign of n ix , which depends on the exact distribution of idiosyncratic preferences φ x . If market shares are concave in copays, the second-order condition always holds. If market shares are convex in copays, the second-order condition holds as long as market shares are not "too convex". A sufficient (but not necessary) condition is log-concavity of n x (c ix , c −ix ) and q x (c ix )n x (c ix , c −ix ) in c ix . The economic intuition is explored further in Carey (2013) .
The first-order condition implicitly defines insurer i's best response c * ix to other insurers' copays. The best response only implicitly defines c * ix because n ix , q ix , n ix , and q ix must be evaluated at the profit-maximizing c * ix . However, since q ix and q ix do not depend on other insurer's copays, we can define q * ix ≡ q x (c * ix ) and
Rearranging the first-order condition, the best response c * ix can be stated analogously to FGM00:
Because the denominator and n x are always negative, copays are always lower than prices for sufficiently large r x . We assume in this research that r x always fulfills this condition.
Equation 1 demonstrates insurer i's incentives in choice of copay. Copay is a type-specific discount off of price. Most importantly for this research, the discount is higher when the exogenous type-specific payment r x is high. FGM00 focus on the possibility that r x is high because premiums are not type-specific (r x = r) and the cost of providing treatment to type x is low. Alternatively, a type-specific payment may be high due to an inaccurate payment system, as in this paper.
Example. Using the same assumptions of log utility for drugs and the TIEV distribution for plan-specific preferences, insurer i's market share takes the familiar logit form. Insurer i's profit on a set of copays c i is
i e vx(cix) (r x − p x /c ix + 1) − κ and profit-maximization with respect to c ix requires the following first-order condition.
The second-order condition holds without further assumptions. Rearranging the first-order condition, the best-response copay is
Symmetric Equilibrium in Copays
Consider a symmetric equilibrium in copays, such that c * ix = c * x for all insurers. When all insurers set c * x , only idiosyncratic preference terms affect plan enrollment:
Recall the definition of u x = v x ( c x ) + µ x : the utility of the plan that is most preferred when plan i is ignored.
Since c x = c ix = c * x , µ x must be the highest of N x − 1 idiosyncratic preference terms drawn from φ x . Since
, its expected value is the expectation of the maximum of N x − 1 draws from the standard uniform:
Imposing the symmetric equilibrium, Equation 1 becomes
Without a distributional assumption, however, there is no closed-form expression for n x (c * x , N x ).
We are now in a position to consider the reaction of equilibrium copays to the number of market participants N x . We expect that, other things equal, more entrants leads to lower copays. Letting ∂n 2 x ∂c * x ∂N x represent the cross-partial derivative of market shares with respect to copay and number of entrants, ∂c * x /∂N x can be obtained from implicitly differentiating the first-order condition.
The expression has the sign of
. In order to ensure that more entrants leads to lower copays, we require
< 0. This condition always holds if more entrants make enrollment more sensitive to copays (
∂c * x ∂Nx may be positive as long as an a% increase in the number of entrants leads to a decrease in the sensitivity of enrollment to copays of less than a%.
If idiosyncratic preferences are distributed TIEV,
Intuitively, if an increase in entrants greatly reduces the sensitivity of enrollment to copays, an insurer's enrollment penalty from higher copays is outweighed by its increase in revenue, and a larger number of entrants leads to higher copays. I assume in this research that
Example. Under the previous functional form and distributional assumptions, when all insurers set c * x , market shares simplify to 1/N x .
Equilibrium copays and per-enrollee profits at these copays are
Step 1: Insurer Entry Decision
In settings like Medicare Part D, insurers commonly provide only a subset of services. I model the decision of what services to provide as an entry problem. If insurer i offers drug x, it pays a fixed cost κ. The fixed cost of entry can be motivated by the cost of negotiating a contract with the maker of drug x. When insurers price at c * x , the resultant per-enrollee profits are always positive:
but an insurer only enters the market for drug x if its equilibrium market share times these per-enrollee profits will cover the fixed cost. Therefore we find N * x such that total profits Π x (c * x , N * x ) = 0; we ignore in this model the fact that N * x may not be an integer.
− κ = 0 Π x is quadratic in N x , but both roots exist and only one is positive.
Example. Under the above functional forms, the entry problem can be written
and the solution is a function of fixed costs and type-specific payments.
Analysis: Effects of Type-Specific Payments r x in Equilibrium
I now proceed to analyze the effect of type-specific payments on equilibrium copays and entry. I show that, when the second-order condition for profit maximization holds, copays rise with type-specific payments while coverage declines.
The first-order and zero-profit conditions together define c * x and N * x in terms of p x , κ, and r x .
The derivatives can be found by applying Cramer's rule to the total derivatives of F and G with respect to parameter r x . Below, the component partial derivatives of F and G are displayed as well as the expressions for the effect of r x . If the second-order condition holds, then ∂G/∂c *
< 0 is required if a higher number of entering insurers is to lead to lower equilibrium copays; the same condition provides signs for the partial derivatives with respect to N * x .
∂F ∂c * x = second-order condition for profit-maximization
These derivatives show that copay falls in type-specific payments r x while the number of entrants rises. The sign of the denominator of the derivatives is potentially ambiguous, but I show in Appendix A.3 that it is negative if the second-order condition for profit-maximization with respect to c * x holds.
Example. Under our functional form and distributional assumptions,. In this simple theoretical model, insurers will disproportionately cover drugs made profitable by a high type-specific payment; copays for these drugs will also be lower. In the next section, I show how to use
Medicare Part D to demonstrate these patterns.
Empirically Testing Insurer Incentives
In this section, I describe a strategy that deploys features of Part D to verify the patterns predicted by the theory. The first step in the strategy is to identify profitable and unprofitable diagnoses within Part D. To do so, I compare diagnosis-specific payments with the actual treatment costs for each diagnosis. A high payment relative to average treatment costs implies the diagnosis is profitable. Next, I propose a method of determining what drugs treat each diagnosis. My research question seeks to assess the impact of a diagnosis's profitability on the benefit design (coverage and copays) of drugs treating that diagnosis. Due to endogeneity concerns for my profitability measure, I propose an instrumental variables strategy. Firstly, I instrument for a diagnosis's profitability using the number of new molecules and first generics entering since payment system calibration. Secondly, I develop a "Hausman" instrument: for each drug, the Hausman instrument is the profitability computed only from the other drugs treating the same diagnosis. The Hausman instrument removes the drug-specific fixed effect which is the primary endogeneity pathway.
Measuring Profitability Through Diagnosis-Specific Payments
I create a measure of profitability by comparing diagnosis-specific payments with each diagnosis's actual treatment costs. In order to make the comparison, I adjust each insurer's total treatment costs for other payments that insurers receive that are not diagnosis-specific (including premium). I then estimate the average treatment costs associated with each diagnosis. If new drug entry and the onset of generic competition have caused average treatment costs to diverge from diagnosis-specific payment levels, the diagnosis is profitable (if treatment costs are lower) or unprofitable (if treatment costs are higher).
The diagnosis-specific payments are meant to make an insurer indifferent among beneficiaries by balancing a Part D insurer's receipts with its liabilities. There are four types of receipts: diagnosis-specific payments, demographic-specific payments, premiums, and government reinsurance payments. An insurer's total liability is what it pays for drugs: the difference between price and copay for each drug purchased in the insurance plan. The payments received by plan i for beneficiary j balance its liabilities when
where DP ij is the diagnosis-specific government payment GP ij is the demographic-specific government payment prem i is insurer i's premium paid by each beneficiary RI ij is the government reinsurance payment L ij is insurer i's total liability for beneficiary j
The diagnosis-specific payments I aim to isolate are part of a beneficiary-specific payment known formally in Part D as the Direct Subsidy. The diagnosis-specific payment depends on the insurer's bid : its expected liability for a typical beneficiary given its copays and coverage (see Section 2.2). Let x index diagnoses.
Then DP ij is computed according to the following function:
W x are the preset diagnosis-specific weights described in Section 2.3 and D jx is 1 if beneficiary j has diagnosis
x. Demographic-specific government payments GP ij are computed in the same way for the demographic categories described in Section 2.3.
Insurance plans also receive premiums and reinsurance payments. Insurer i's premium prem i is removed from the Direct Subsidy and therefore drops out of the payment equation. I adjust plan's total liability for reinsurance payments, demographic-specific payments, and plan bids.
The adjusted plan liability L ij represents what demographic-specific payments were on average meant to cover.
I now estimate new weights ω x for each diagnosis to compare to the diagnosis-specific weight W x .
I estimate the above equation using OLS. If the diagnosis-specific payments are accurate, W x and ω x , will be approximately equivalent. The results of estimation are discussed in Section 6.2.
Linking Drugs and Diagnoses
Among the reasons that Part D is well-suited to the empirical analysis in this paper is that drugs are relatively closely linked to diagnoses, and diagnoses in turn are associated with profitability through inaccurate diagnosis-specific payments. Unfortunately, no reference work links drugs to the 86 diagnoses in the payment system. Instead, I use the empirical association between drugs and diagnoses, made possible by my very large sample of Medicare beneficiaries. An advantage of linking drugs and diagnoses using actual Part D data (rather than a reference work) is that I account for diagnosis-specific undercoding. A diagnosis is undercoded if health professionals do not tend to report it in medical claims. If the diagnosis is not coded in medical claims, Part D plans do not receive the diagnosis-specific payment for it, even if the beneficiary takes drugs for the diagnosis. In the extreme case, if a diagnosis is never recorded, coverage and copay of a drug that treats it should not be affected by the diagnosis's payment level. Research suggests that undercoding varies by diagnosis and is particularly common for mental diagnoses such as depression (Townsend et al., 2012) . In other settings, insurers sometimes encourage physicians to upcode individuals by reporting diagnoses the individuals do not have in order to activate diagnosis-specific payments from the government.
In those settings (e.g., Medicare Advantage), insurers have a contract with physicians to provide services to their enrolles; an advantage of Part D is that no such contracts exist, making it harder for insurers to communicate with or influence physicians.
In order to abstract from differences in strength or drug form (tablet, capsule, ointment), I link diagnoses to ingredients or ingredient combinations. Then individuals who take (branded) Prozac Weekly are considered to take the same drug ingredient as individuals who take (generic) 10mg fluoxetine tablets or 15mg fluoxetine capsules.
I run a probit model that predicts whether each beneficiary takes a given ingredient combination based on his or her diagnoses. Each coefficient gives the increase in the probability of taking the given ingredient combination associated with having the given diagnosis. For each ingredient combination, I define it as "treating" the diagnosis with the largest coefficient in the probit.
Assessing the Impact of Profitability
Finally, I predict insurers' choice of coverage and copay using the profitability implied by the payment system.
For each insurance plan, I use an insurer-specific measure of profitability: specifically,
R xi is the difference in dollars between what an insurer receives for a beneficiary with diagnosis x and the average treatment costs for this diagnosis. I refer to R xi as the profitability of diagnosis x for insurer i.
When R xi is positive, the diagnosis-specific payment for x exceeds the average treatment costs for x, and enrollees in insurer i with x are profitable on average; conversely, when R xi is negative, insurers pay more on average to treat diagnosis x than they receive in diagnosis-specific payments. To note, a given diagnosis is either profitable or unprofitable; however, the magnitude is insurer-specific depending on the insurer's bid.
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I use simple linear methods to test the empirical association of profitability R xi with insurer i's benefit design for drugs that treat diagnosis x. I consider three benefit design outcomes Y di for each drug d and insurer i: coverage (1/0), copay in dollars, and copay as a percent of list price. Drug d (specifically, its ingredients) treats diagnosis x. My main estimation equation is:
A full set of insurer fixed effects δ i net out all insurer-level patterns in benefit design such as overall generosity.
Recall from Section 2.2 that insurers must cover at least two drugs in each "therapeutic class." When Y di is coverage, I include dummies for each therapeutic class, T C d , to control for the insurer's choice set.
I weight each observation by the total expenditure for the drug among Medicare Advantage enrollees.
Weighting is used because drugs vary in their total expenditure by a factor of hundreds of millions. If insurers and beneficiaries have limited resources, they will base their decision (benefit design or enrollment) on drugs accounting for more expenditure. In the framework of Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge (2013) , the use of expenditure weights recovers the average partial effect of profitability in the presence of unmodeled heterogeneity across total expenditure levels in how strongly Part D agents respond to incentives. 
Addressing Profitability's Endogeneity
An ordinary least squares approach to assessing the impact of profitability on benefit design includes a omitted variables problem. The empirical framework for Part D treatment costs and benefit design can be summarized in three equations.
Each drug comes with a fundamental unobserved "quality" that determines (1) how insurers choose benefit design for it and (2) levels of utilization given a particular benefit design. Drug-specific quality affects Part D benefit design because insurers need to offer high-quality drugs on favorable terms to attract enrollees.
Drug-specific quality affects profitability because high-quality drugs are taken more often at any copay, raising treatment costs for insurers. When I estimate Equation 3, the treatment costs ω x that I recover are a function of unobserved drug quality.
Ideally I could estimate the True Model given in the second equation and explicitly account for unobserved drug quality. For example, if the payment system randomly assigned higher payments for diagnosis x to certain insurers, we would have a situation where drug d is more profitable for certain insurers than for others. Patterns in their benefit design would identify unobserved drug quality separately from the reaction to profitability. Instead, each drug has the profitability of the diagnosis it treats, and I cannot separately identify a drug-specific fixed effect. In the Estimation Model in the third equation, the drug-specific quality term is now contained in the error term, affecting both profitability (through ω x ) and benefit design. I propose two strategies to address the endogeneity of profitability. Secondly, I develop a "Hausman" instrument that computes profitability using only the other drugs treating a given diagnosis.
8 That is to say, when predicting the benefit design for drug d, I instrument for profitability using a measure that excludes claims for drug d from the estimation of Equation 3. The instrument name is adopted, with apologies, due to its kinship to the instruments in Hausman (1997) which predict endogenous price in a given market from average price in other markets.
9 As in Section 5.2, I abstract from drug strength by defining drug d by its ingredient or ingredient combination. 10 While FDA data on new molecules is straightforward, there are two sources of measurement error in my identification of new generics. Firstly, FDA approval of new generics is not synonymous with market entry. Generic manufacturers frequently apply for FDA approval while relevant patents are still in effect. The patent-holding pharmaceutical firm then sues the generic manufacturer to stave off market entry. I counter this by dropping ingredient combinations that the FDA reports as "new generics" that do not appear as generics in the 2009 Part D claims data. The second source of measurement error is introduced by the fact that drugs with the same ingredients vary in strength. The FDA reports approval of a new strength as a "new generic" even if the ingredients have previously been available as generics in other strengths. But the most dramatic price decreases occur when the most popular strengths are introduced right after patent expiry. I counter this by using sell to wholesalers and chain warehouses" (Berndt and Newhouse, 2010) . I obtain each drug's ingredients with the help of the RxNORM drug database. Finally, I check my ingredients-diagnosis linkage against the Prescription Drug Morbidity Groups (RxMGs) of the Johns Hopkins Adjusted Clinical Groups Case-Mix System, a commercial product used by insurers to model expected liabilities. The ACG Case-Mix System predicts the "morbidity groups" an individual is likely to have based on prescription drug claims. The "morbidity groups" do not correspond perfectly to payment system diagnoses, but many are very similar.
The empirical strategy described in this section tests the hypothesis that Part D insurers use choice of coverage and copays to attract the profitable and deter the unprofitable. I now proceed to estimation. Table 1 reports the number of diagnoses appearing on each beneficiary's medical claims. The next rows show the distribution of payments received by these beneficiaries' insurers. Consistent with the large dispersion in costs, payments to insurers vary greatly. Diagnosis-specific payments average just over half of total payments to Part D insurers (less at the extremes). Other payments (demographic-specific and reinsurance) payments are a large proportion of payments for the very healthy and the very sick.
The next rows of this table describe insurer's adjusted liability for each beneficiary. Adjusted liability ( L ij ) is the portion of plan liabilities that diagnosis-specific payments are meant to cover and is the left hand side of Equation 3. For individuals with very low utilization, demographic-specific payments make adjusted liability negative. In the next line, I describe the distribution of diagnosis-specific payments minus adjusted liability, which varies widely. When this difference is negative, this beneficiary was (ex post) unprofitable and conversely when this difference is positive this beneficiary was (ex post) profitable. One explanation for the large disparity in profitability among beneficiaries is that the diagnosis-specific payments were wrong.
The second panel contains basic information about the nearly three million beneficiaries used to link ingredients and diagnoses.
Turning to drugs, Table 2 Two patterns emerge from this table. Firstly, copays are commonly far above or below 25% of negotiated prices. Differences in diagnosis-specific payments are not the only potential explanation, but clearly insurers are taking advantage of benefit design latitude. Secondly, while drugs with higher list prices are covered more often and at higher copays, coverage and copay are surprisingly similar across quintiles, suggesting that list price is not the primary factor in benefit design.
Taken together, these data suggest that the potential rewards to benefit design are great (some beneficiaries cost much less or more than plans receive in payments for them), and that insurers are engaging in some degree of it (copays are not 25%). In the next section I show how comparing diagnosis-specific payments to each diagnosis's treatment costs defines each diagnosis as profitable or unprofitable. Table 3 .
Results: Measuring Profitability Through Diagnosis-Specific Payments
11 Figure 2 .b depicts the profitability of each diagnosis (last column of Table 3 ). In each figure, diagnoses are sorted by payment level; there is no statistical relationship between payment level and profitability. 
Results: Linking Drugs and Diagnoses
I estimate a series of probits predicting utilization of a given drug ingredient (or ingredient combination)
by diagnoses in the payment system. The sample is described in the bottom panel of Table 1 and For each ingredient combination, I compare the diagnosis with the largest coefficient in the probit to the "morbidity group" specified by the ACG Case-Mix System. In general, the probit-based strategy accurately links ingredients to diagnoses they treat. When problems arise, it is because the diagnoses in the Part D payment system are narrowly defined. For example, while pain is a common complaint for many diagnoses, pain drugs tend to be linked to only a few (mostly Disorders of the Spine and Migraine Headaches). Meanwhile, contraceptive hormones tend to be linked to Vaginal and Cervical Diseases. I include pain and hormonal drugs in my drug sample despite spurious matching; results are strengthened when they are excluded.
6.4 Results: Addressing Profitability's Endogeneity 
Results: Assessing the Impact of Profitability
The relationship between profitability and benefit design is reported for the full drug sample and three subsamples, described in Table 4 . The first sample is 522 branded drugs not in one of the six "protected" therapeutic classes covered in Section 2.2. These drugs represent about half of Part D spending in 2009.
In the second panel I describe benefit design for 2699 generic drugs. The final panel describes 371 drugs in the protected classes, where benefit design is constrained by regulation. Generic drugs and protected drugs account for about 30% and 20% of Part D spending, respectively. Plans could apply for permission to exclude a protected drug and according to the data a small number received it. However, across 1550 plans and 371 protected drugs, the rate of coverage is 97%, compared with 65% for unprotected drugs. Table 5 reports the results of estimating Equations 4. The four panels reflect estimation on the full drug sample and the three subsamples. The first three columns report estimation by OLS. OLS estimation demonstrates a positive association between profitability and coverage, although the effect is only significant at the 5% level in the full sample. The magnitude of the association is quite small -an extra hundred dollars in payment for a given diagnosis would raise the drug's rate of coverage by a tenth of a percentage point.
The OLS results for copay are more significant both statistically and economically. An extra dollar in a diagnosis-specific payment is associated with copays lower by 76 cents. We also find evidence that copay as a percent of list price falls. Recall we only observe copay for covered drugs, lowering the number of observations relative to the equation predicting coverage (list price is missing for a small number of drugs).
The second set of columns report estimation by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) when instrumenting with the Hausman measure described in Section 5.4. As expected from the relationship depicted in Figure   4 , the Hausman instrument strongly predicts profitability. The results using this instrument are similar to the results using OLS. Standard errors inflate slightly and effect sizes for coverage and copay as a percent of list price are modestly larger.
The third set of columns report estimation by 2SLS instrumenting by the total number of new molecules and new generics treating each diagnosis entering after 2002 but before 2009. Standard errors inflate in this specification relative to OLS. Most coefficients are statistically null, although signs largely point in the same direction as reports using OLS and the Hausman instrument. This specification finds the strongest evidence for a causal relationship between profitability and copay.
Due to weak-instrument concerns, I also estimate a just-identified 2SLS model which instruments for profitability using only the number of generics. These results offer stronger evidence for a relationship between profitability and coverage: insurers covered more drugs for diagnoses with larger numbers of new generics. For the subsample of protected drugs when the outcome is copay or copay as a percent of list price, new generics do not significantly predict profitability in the first-stage regression, producing invalid second-stage results.
The relationship between profitability and copay varies across branded, generic, and protected drugs.
The largest relationship is found for protected drugs and the smallest for generic drugs; the relationship for branded drugs lies between the two in magnitude but is not robust to technological change instruments.
As these nearly 3000 generic drugs account for only 30% of Part D expenditure, optimizing benefit design perfectly across each drug is probably not worth insurer's efforts. It is not surprising, then, that profitability affects benefit designs only weakly for generic drugs. Given the regulation requiring coverage for protected drugs, it is not surprising that insurers take advantage of the only benefit design tool remaining by strongly raising copays as profitability falls. However, coefficients above unity in magnitude are hard to explain without recourse to forces not studied in this paper. In particular, Duggan and Scott-Morton (2010) find evidence suggesting that insurers paid relatively higher prices to pharmaceutical firms for drugs in the protected classes.
Taken together, the results in Table 5 suggest (1) a relatively strong causal relationship between profitability and copay and (2) a weaker and economically minor relationship between profitability and coverage.
In addition, the positive relationship between profitability and coverage relies on the inclusion of therapeutic class dummies. This suggests that plans are reacting to profitability within the bounds of what Part D regulation allows. Recall that coverage regulations require plans to cover two drugs per therapeutic class, while the copay regulations simply require that total copays amount to 25% of total expenditures. An insurer wishing to set unfavorable benefits for drugs that treat unprofitable diagnoses still must meet the two-drug coverage requirement for each therapeutic class (diagnoses and therapeutic classes are related but do not correspond perfectly). But the insurer is free to set high copays for these drugs as long as copays for other drugs (e.g., those that treat profitable diagnoses) are lowered. Given the success of the therapeutic class coverage regulation at limiting insurers' ability to act on benefit design incentives, policymakers should consider revising copay regulations to require the 25% standard to be met within therapeutic classes. When the payment system is diagnosis-specific, regulation should acknowledge insurers' diagnosis-specific benefit design incentives.
To place the effect sizes in context, I recompute copays in the Part D claims data as though payments had been accurate, but enrollment and utilization were held constant. That is to say, suppose I find that treatment costs for diagnosis x are $50 lower than its payment, such that diagnosis x is profitable. If instead the payment for diagnosis x had been $50 lower, such that payment equaled treatment costs, copays for drugs that treat diagnosis x would be higher. 12 In particular, copays for a branded drug that treat diagnosis
x should rise by $28.30 (50 × the coefficient on copay in the second row and second column in Table 5 );
12 Coverage for drugs that treat x would be lower, but I disregard changes in coverage due to the strong assumptions required to calculate the impact. Firstly, altering the rate of coverage of the drugs that treat a given diagnosis requires me to randomly select some drug-insurer combinations and reassign them to covering or uncovering. Secondly, when accurate payments imply the rate of coverage should rise, I must impute a copay to drug-insurer combinations reassigned to covering. Finally, the assumption of fixed enrollment and utilization is stronger when coverage is changing than when copays are changing. Excluding the effect of coverage leads to an underestimate of the total impact of inaccurate payments. copays should rise $1.85 for each generic drug treating x. Summing recomputed copays across each Part D enrollee's claims, about three-fifths of Part D enrollees would pay more in copays if the payment system had been accurate, while the remainder would pay less. The size of the transfer from enrollees who happen to have profitable diagnoses to enrollees who happen to have unprofitable diagnoses is approximately $1.5 billion, which amounts of 9% of total enrollee outlays (copays + premiums) in Part D.
Conclusion
Payment systems that condition payments on enrollee type are essential when insurer discrimination is prohibited. In this paper, I first described why the payment system in Part D might have failed to neutralize insurer benefit design incentives in Medicare Part D. Next, a model of coverage and copay showed how these key strategic variables might be affected by diagnosis-specific payments that diverge from average treatment costs. I measured the profitability of diagnoses in Part D by comparing diagnosis-specific payments to treatment costs, and found that many diagnoses were clearly profitable or unprofitable. I introduced two instruments to counter the endogeneity of my profitability measure. Finally, I showed that insurers covered drugs that treat profitable diagnoses at higher rates and lower copay.
In practical terms, there are strategies that would make the diagnosis-specific payment system more accurate, but in the classic tradeoff identified by Newhouse (1996) , they can result in inefficiencies. Since changes in the medical industry (in this case, the entry of new drugs and the expiry of patent-protected exclusivity) alter the costs of treating a diagnosis over time, more frequent updating of payment levels can improve accuracy. In the extreme, payments can be a function of past-year utilization, so that payments automatically rise when treatment becomes more expensive (Hsu et al., 2009; Kautter, Ingber, Pope, and Freeman, 2012) . But as payment systems become more accurate, they come to resemble a standard reimbursement system. Insurers lose their incentive to select the profitable and deter the unprofitable, but they also lose their incentive to deter unnecessary utilization: an insurer who incurs high liabilities for a given diagnosis this year can count on higher payments for that diagnosis the next year (McAdams and Schwarz, 2007) .
Future research should acknowledge the role of an upstream medical provider such as a drug firm. Current models (including my own) do not consider how profitability affects the price an insurer pays for a service.
Suppose insurers cover services for the unprofitable rarely and at high copays, while covering services for the profitable generously. Might those who supply the service for the unprofitable react by lowering their price?
Might those who supply the service for the profitable, seeing that insurers find them profitable, demand a higher service price? Carey (2013) establishes how risk-adjusted payments theoretically pass-through to an upstream provider in a bilateral monopoly, but further theoretical research and empirical verification await.
multiplying through by the (negative) common denominator q ix n ix +q ix n ix , and collect all the terms containing r x . Log-concavity of the enrollment function n x and the product q x n x emerges as a sufficient condition for the negativity of the second-order condition. Log-concavity of a function f means that ln f is concave, or
A.2 Partial Derivative of Entry Condition With Respect to Copay
The partial derivative of the entry condition G with respect to equilibrium copay can be shown to be positive as long as the second-order condition (shown above) is negative. 
∂G ∂c
x , collect the terms containing r x , and divide by −q *
+ if nx is log-concave
We therefore find that the condition for the sign of this partial derivative is identical to the condition for the negativity of the second-order condition. Then, as long as c * x is a local maximum, ∂G/∂c * x > 0.
A.3 Denominator of Derivatives
The denominator of each derivative of interest is potentially ambiguous; I show that it is negative whenever the second-order condition for profit-maximization holds.
is the second-order condition (SOC) and that in the prior section we found
Again, substitute for κ from the fact that G(c *
and similarly for n * x , and state N *
Then the denominator of the derivatives is negative whenever the SOC holds. Simulated equilibrium copays (c * x ) and number of entrants (N * x ) as generated by the model described in Section 4 under log utility for drugs and idiosyncratic preferences from the Type I Extreme Value Distribution. Drug price is 100 and the fixed cost of entry is 5, while type-specific payments r x vary between 10 and 110. Table 3 . The solid circles represent the diagnosis-specific payments (scaled into dollars by the national average bid) for diagnoses at the 10 th , 30 th , 50 th , 70 th , and 90 th percentiles of the distribution of profitability (where profitability is defined as the difference between diagnosis-specific payments and treatment costs) for the 69 diagnoses treated by a sample drug. The open circles represent the estimated treatment costs in 2009 for each diagnosis, and the dots above and below represent the 95% CI of estimation. Table 2 . The first row in each group reports the distribution of the percent of plans covering a given drug. The second and third rows first average copay and copay as a percentage of plan-specific price across plans, and then report the distribution across drugs in the list price quintile. The next row reports the dollar value (in thousands) of total expenditures on the drug in Medicare Advantage. 
